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Abstract.  There is a perennial philosophical dream of a certain natural order for the natural kinds.  
The name of this dream is ‘the hierarchy requirement’ (or ‘assumption’ or ‘thesis’).  According to 
this postulate, proper natural kinds form a taxonomy which is both unique (i.e., there is only one 
taxonomy of such natural kinds) and traditional (i.e., said taxonomy consists of nested relations 
between specific and then more general kinds, each kind occupying one and only one particular 
place within that framework of relations).  Here I demonstrate that complex scientific objects exist: 
objects which generate different systems of scientific classification, produce myriad legitimate 
alternatives amongst the nonetheless still natural kinds, and make the hierarchical dream impossible 
to realize, except at absurdly great cost.  Philosophical hopes for a certain order in nature cannot be 
fulfilled.  Natural kinds crosscut one another, ubiquitously so, and this crosscutting spells the end of 
the hierarchical dream. 
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The so-called ‘natural kinds’ are living a double life in philosophy today.  In certain company—
predominately amongst philosophers of science—natural kinds just are whichever empirical 
categories scientists effectively deploy to understand and manipulate the world.  Because scientists in 
one discipline often have different experimental and explanatory interests from scientists in another, 
scientists in different disciplines often have different systems of categorization.  These different 
systems are generally suited to the aims and practices of the sciences in which they are deployed, and 
these systems will often classify in crisscrossing or crosscutting ways,1 yet each still tracks select 
scientific facts about whatever is being categorized.  Here is an elegant exemplar of this sort of view: 
Kind-talk simply reflects distributions of causal properties.  One describes cases in which 
distributions are sociable enough to be useful, convenient, or interesting as instances of kinds.  
But no classification, so long as it is made on the basis of properties in the world, whether in 
terms of an essence or a cluster, is more or less objective than any other.  The subjectivity of 
the choice, generally made to serve everyday or scientific ends, is thus independent of the 
question of what is natural. (Chakravartty 2007, 178–179) 
 
To philosophers of science of this sort,2 natural kinds are more than merely nominal—they have 
empirical elements, after all, and they are epistemically effective—but they fall far short of the 
divine.  It makes little sense to talk of these natural kinds in hushed tones.  There is no one true 
taxonomy here; no solitary way of carving nature “where the joint is.”3  Rather, there are many 
acceptable cuts to make, and thereby, many acceptable kinds to form.  Sometimes, we will be able to 
                                               
1 My use of this terminology is due to, and nicely explained by: Khalidi (1993, 1998); Tobin (2010). 
2 There are many.  Here is one representative quote from each of the past four decades: “[D]ifferent 
sorts of classification schemes are indexed to different scientific purposes” (Bursten 2018, 18); 
“Those in the grip of Plato’s metaphor suppose not only that there is a privileged way to divide 
nature into objects but that there are natural ways to assort those objects into kinds… I see a 
dependence on human capacities and human purposes” (Kitcher 2001, 48); “All the kinds of which 
we are aware occur in the social setting of those interested” (Hacking 1990, 116); and “When the 
classificatory problem is approached from a more restricted point of view, that is, with an interest 
only in a certain range of properties, many peaks will disappear, while others may be emphasized… 
Even within biology different interests call for the emphasis of different distinctions” (Dupré 1981, 
83). 
3 As expressed by Socrates in Plato’s Phaedrus (265e).  A related notion is articulated by the Stranger 
to Young Socrates in Plato’s Statesman (287c). 
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relate such kinds from one branch of science to kinds from another, and in an orderly fashion; but 
in many cases, we will not. 
Other philosophers have an alternative—an elevated—view of natural kinds.  Amongst the 
more metaphysically-inclined, natural kinds are often more than just those empirical categories which 
scientists effectively deploy in order to understand and manipulate the world.  Even if it is the case 
that scientists in one discipline have different interests from scientists in another, and respectively 
different systems of categorization, there could still be a subset of scientific kinds—the natural ones, 
properly understood—for which there are no acceptable alternatives from any perspective.  On this 
sort of view, admitting a group into the ranks of the natural kinds requires more than just identifying 
an objective division in some bit of the world; it requires identifying the singularly best way of 
objectively dividing that bit of the world.  Consider the following programmatic declaration: 
If the world has no intrinsic structure, I thought, then, in principle, any single way of 
conceptualizing the world might be as good as any other.  There would be an objective world, 
and perhaps from a human perspective, a best description of it.  But such a description might 
not also be best from the point of view of an alien being, whose epistemic values might well 
be different from ours.  However, if the world had a natural kind structure, I reasoned, then 
we should be able to classify things in the world objectively in two quite different ways – 
vertically, in terms of the distinct objects that are the members of the natural kinds, and 
horizontally – in terms of the kinds to which they belong, and hence the properties they must 
have by virtue of their memberships of these kinds.  In that case, there would be a set of 
objective facts about the world – facts that would exist independently of how we, or any other 
being, might think or reason about the world.  The hypothesis of natural-kind structure of 
reality thus promised to yield a solution to the objective knowledge problem, for objective 
knowledge could then be defined with reference to this structure. (Ellis 2001, xiii) 
 
To metaphysicians of this inclination,4 natural kinds are incredibly special kinds.  They are based on 
                                               
4 Again, there are many.  Here are representative quotes from three founders of this tradition: “An 
important class, philosophically as well as linguistically, is the class of general names associated with 
natural kinds—that is, with classes of things that we regard as of explanatory importance; classes 
whose normal distinguishing characteristics are ‘held together’ or even explained by deep-lying 
mechanisms” (Putnam 1970, 187; italics original); “Therefore I claim, again, that a satisfactory 
account of natural kinds must fulfill our two conditions: members of natural kinds have real 
essences, and natural kinds characteristically lend themselves to scientific investigation” (Wilkerson 
1988, 34); and “I will call proper natural kinds of this sort ‘eternal natural kinds’, later distinguishing 
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intrinsic rather than extrinsic properties; they track essential as opposed to accidental features of 
their members; they explain the necessary character of certain observed regularities in the world 
(those we tend to christen laws of nature); they license our best scientific inferences; and they solve 
the objective knowledge problem.  Natural kinds, of this sort, are the rarest birds among us.  To the 
most fervent of such believers, natural kind knowledge is the product of incredible scientific effort 
and ingenuity, and the discovery of natural kinds is what the very best science aims to achieve. 
 The ultimate aim of this paper is to demonstrate that even if we restrict our account of 
natural kinds in this latter way (reserving the term for our most select scientific groupings), we 
should not expect a single, hierarchical arrangement of the natural kinds (a solitary taxonomy of our 
most fundamental groupings) to follow.  This failure, I will argue, is due to the scientific existence of 
complexity.  Complexity begets crosscutting, which dooms hierarchy. 
The argument happens in a series of parts.  In section one, I characterize what is variously 
termed the hierarchy assumption/requirement/thesis.  In section two, I propose that we distinguish 
three classificatory activities: characterization, individuation, and organization.  This step is a crucial 
one, as it prevents discussion of the subsequent case study from being dismissed on normative 
grounds—as a mere description of how science is actually, but not ideally, practiced.  Then I 
introduce the case study itself.  In section three, I characterize a set of complex scientific kinds 
known as nuclear receptors.  In section four, I describe a trio of equally legitimate, intradisciplinary-
yet-nonetheless-crosscutting systems for arranging the nuclear receptors.  In section five, I deploy an 
analysis of complexity in order to explain the documented classificatory divergence.  In section six, I 
                                               
them from ‘historical natural kinds’. The various branches of physics and of chemistry concern 
eternal natural kinds exclusively, assuming that we take such disciplines as historical geography and 
cosmogony to be applications rather than branches of physics and chemistry.  Astronomy, in so far 
as it deals with the various kinds of bodies in outer space (astrophysics) rather than with the 
placement and interactions among specific historical bodies, concerns eternal kinds. We can call 
these sciences ‘eternal sciences’” (Millikan 1999, 50). 
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assess the implications of my case study for “one true taxonomy” visions of natural kindhood.  In 
section seven, I block a potential appeal to the epistemic success of science as a way of dismissing 
my case.  Finally, in section eight, I relate my discussion of hierarchy, crosscutting, and complexity to 
notions of sameness, similarity, and simplicity—notions which tend to play important, though oft 
overlooked, roles in philosophical debate about natural kinds. 
1. The Expectation of Hierarchy 
There are different ways to express the expectation that natural kinds, properly understood, should 
permit of only one arrangement—that strict natural kindhood entails an exclusive set of structured 
relationships among the natural kinds.  Robert A. Wilson calls this idea ‘the ordering assumption’, 
and glosses it as “there is one way in which different natural kinds are related to one another” 
(Wilson 1999, 189; italics original).  Here is Brian Ellis in 2001, articulating Richmond Thomason’s 
view from 1969, of what Ellis terms ‘the hierarchy requirement’: “if anything is a member of more 
than one natural kind, then one of these kinds must be a species of the other” (Ellis 2001, 56).  P. D. 
Magnus explains and historicizes the situation thusly: 
A tradition going back to Aristotle insists that each individual belongs to just one maximally 
specific kind.  There is another more generic kind that includes everything of the specific kind 
as well as others.  That kind is included entirely in an even more generic kind.  Natural kinds 
are nested in one another like stacking dolls.  Call this the hierarchy assumption. (Magnus 2012, 
37; italics original) 
 
And in an article that should have buried the notion for good, but somehow did not, Muhammad 
Ali Khalidi explains what he calls ‘the hierarchic thesis’ as the idea “that natural categories cannot 
crosscut one another” (Khalidi 1998, 35).  To “crosscut” is just the term which Khalidi prefers to 
use for kinds that overlap, neither perfectly nor with total subsumption.5 
                                               
5 Examination of the literature reveals that introduction of the term ‘crosscutting kinds’ is often de re 
attributed to Dupré (1993)—by Dupré himself (2006), for instance, and by other scholars such as 
Tobin (2010) and Potochnik (2011, 2017).  Dupré comes close to introducing the term itself: he uses 
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According to Khalidi, there are two reasons why the claim about hierarchy is important for 
the strict view of natural kinds: (1) “this claim is tied to the further claim that there is one best 
classification scheme in each area of human inquiry” (Khalidi 1998, 35), and (2) the claim “seems to 
be needed in arguing that each such category has a unique essence associated with it across possible 
worlds” (Khalidi 1998, 35).  So, Khalidi endeavors to see if the hierarchy requirement can be met.  
First, he surveys kind terms from ordinary language (‘red’ and ‘round’), and quickly establishes that 
such categories are often crosscutting.  The hierarchical claim obviously fails in that domain.  Next, 
he considers some scientific candidates (such as ‘parasite’ and ‘poison’), and again, Khalidi quickly 
establishes that these categories are often crosscutting.  Perhaps these are not the real scientific 
kinds, though?  Khalidi immediately furnishes many examples of putatively real scientific categories 
which nonetheless crosscut one another (‘larva’, ‘pupa’, and ‘imago’ cut across species categories; 
‘solid’, ‘liquid’, and ‘gas’ cut across categories of the Periodic Table).  Then, Khalidi posits that 
different, crosscutting systems of categorization likely emerge from different interests.  He 
writes:“[i]f classification is always relative to certain interests, we would expect some taxonomies to 
reorganize some of the same entities in different ways without displacing existing ones” (Khalidi 
1998, 42).  Eventually, Khalidi suggests that we can and ought to use this notion of interests—in 
conjunction with that of subject matter—in order to demarcate domains of scientific inquiry.  He 
claims that “it is not enough to point to a set of entities or phenomena in order to specify the focus 
                                               
the antonym ‘clear-cut’ to describe the opposite kind of kinds in his “Natural Kinds and Biological 
Taxa” (1981, 73); shortly thereafter he describes some classifications as “blurred” (1983, 334); and a 
decade later, in his “The Disorder of Things,” Dupré writes of ways of classifying which “cross-
classify” one another (1993, 18 and 36).  However, if we are being quite strict about the introduction 
of ‘crosscutting kinds’, then I think de dicto attribution goes to Khalidi—for his use of ‘crisscrossing 
categories’ in “Carving Nature at the Joints” (1993, 108) and the titular ‘crosscutting categories’ in 
his “Natural Kinds and Crosscutting Categories” (1998).  In the latter case, Khalidi (1998) appears to 
have been inspired by Wimsatt’s talk of levels, entities, and perspectives which do or do not “cross-
cut” (1994, 262–265). 
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or area of inquiry of a particular discipline or subdiscipline” (Khalidi 1998, 47).  In sum, Khalidi 
characterizes different scientific domains as at least partially demarcated by different scientific 
interests—interests which conspire to generate different and crosscutting but still legitimate 
classification systems, both among and within different domains.  He concludes that: 
At first, it might seem that different disciplines investigate different spatiotemporal levels, 
whereas different subdisciplines investigate the same levels relative to different interests.  But 
there are many exceptions to this rule.  Some disciplines cut through a wide range of levels, as 
in the case of physics.  Within some subdisciplines, different interests may generate more than 
one classification scheme.  In toxicology itself, poisons may be classified in terms of the target 
organ they affect, in terms of the chemical mechanism they exploit, in terms of their poisoning 
potential, in terms of their route of absorption into the body, and so on. (Khalidi 1998, 49–50) 
 
Khalidi correspondingly rejects the hierarchic thesis, arguing that “uniqueness is not a promising 
construal of what makes a system of categories ‘natural’” (Khalidi 1998, 50). 
 I think that Khalidi is right about all of this—especially, about the proposed disassociation 
of natural categories from unique ones.  And yet it is clear from the literature that the idea of one 
true natural kind taxonomy still holds sway.  Even some who style themselves anti-realist about 
natural kinds find this notion alluring: 
According to the Categorical Bottleneck Account the natural kinds correspond to those categories 
that are metaphorical ‘bottlenecks’ in the following sense: they reflect the categories that both 
ourselves and a large array of scientific inquirers with epistemic aims and cognitive capacities 
different from our own would sanction in common, thereby converging on a single set of 
categories and kinds from multiple, distinct starting positions or points-of-view. (Franklin-Hall 
2015, 940; italics original) 
 
In this representative recent case, Laura Franklin-Hall proposes an account that is in part justified by 
its commitment to interest-dependent but not interest-relative natural kinds.  I suspect that the 
unabashed interest-relativity of Khalidi’s account of supposedly real scientific kinds goes a long way 
towards explaining its failure to wake more philosophers from their ongoing hierarchical dream. 
 If you start with a kind like ‘poison’—with its very general meaning, broad swath of 
application, and obvious human investment—then it will not be difficult to find different ways of 
arranging the items within the kind (in this case, individual poisons) with respect to one another.  
  8 
Each of these arrangements will likely seem as legitimate as the others do, and as the category itself 
does.  But I think that proponents of the elevated view of natural kinds are likely to regard this 
starting point—the category ‘poison’—as not all that legitimate, as a candidate natural kind, in the 
first place.  In such circumstances, the fact that the category admits of equally legitimate but 
different arrangements of the sub-kinds within it is likely to provide further reason to reject ‘poison’ 
as a proper natural kind, rather than to reject the hierarchy requirement.  So let us consider a 
crosscutting case that should be much harder for the strict natural kind theorist to reject. 
2. Characterization, Individuation, and Organization 
Before we can do that, the introduction of some clarificatory terminology is required.  Cases of 
interdisciplinary divergence in classification are common and should be familiar: these are cases in 
which theorists from different domains (internal or external to science) use different classification 
systems for what they are calling or viewing as the same ideas, objects, processes, events, or 
phenomena of interest.  To provide just one notable example, John Dupré (1981, 1993) discusses 
various classificatory practices pertaining to a particular botanical family (Liliaceae).  Although 
botanists might be happy grouping various decorative flowers along with onion and garlic, others 
(such as chefs or gardeners) will likely prefer alternative arrangements.  Hence, we have divergent 
classification systems for the same set of plants: different systems for tracking the different interests 
which different domains have. 
In contrast, when Khalidi (1998) discusses toxicologists arranging different poisons 
differently with respect to one another, on the basis of different factors—affected organ, chemical 
mechanism, poison potential, and means of absorption—Khalidi is providing an example of 
intradisciplinary classificatory divergence.  Cases like these are ones in which theorists from within the 
same domain nonetheless use different classification systems for what they are calling or viewing as 
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the same ideas, objects, processes, events, or phenomena of interest.  Biological species should be a 
familiar case here.  When Dupré (1981, 1993, 2001), Khalidi (1993, 1998), and many others discuss 
problems with the species category—such as how difficult it is for evolutionary biologists to settle 
on the meaning of the term ‘species’, or for bacteriologists to specify the relationships between their 
species taxa—these philosophers of science are discussing intradisciplinary classificatory divergence. 
But the demarcation between intra- and interdisciplinary classificatory divergence is not the 
only pertinent distinction to draw.6  In discussing problems with the species category just now, I 
mentioned both a difficulty defining ‘species’ and a difficulty arranging already-identified species 
with respect to one another.  And there is an implicit third difficulty that can arise—an intermediate 
one—lurking between these two already-made-explicit classificatory difficulties: that of species 
identification.  This sort of difficulty can occur even with a definition of the term in hand, and 
without having to arrange identified species with respect to one another.  In short, there are three 
distinct classificatory activities being referred to here; and this sort of classificatory diversity is not 
limited to the species case.  Whenever we classify, there are elements of characterization, 
individuation, and organization to consider.  Classificatory characterization focuses the meaning or 
definition of the categories (or kind terms) that we are considering.  Classificatory individuation 
focuses on identifying which items in the world (often known as tokens) belong in the categories (or 
kinds, or types) that we are considering.  Classificatory organization focuses on arranging the various 
categories (or kinds, or types) that we are considering with respect to one another.7  In philosophical 
                                               
6 Please see Tobin (2010) for a related (but not the same) distinction between ‘intertaxonomic’ and 
‘intrataxonomic’ crosscutting; see also Beebee (2013) for the addition of ‘artificial’ and 
‘interparadigm’ crosscutting. 
7 Imagine we are engaged in a project of classifying frozen desserts.  Efforts at characterization might 
include claims like “gelato is made with little or no eggs, while ice cream typically includes eggs.”  
Efforts at individuation might include claims like “the contents of that container—the one currently in 
your freezer, labeled ‘artisanal gelato’, and which you bought at your Midwestern US grocery store 
last week—consist of ice cream, not gelato.”  Efforts at organization might include claims like “ice 
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parlance, the focus of classificatory characterization is intension (and perhaps connotation); the 
focus of classificatory individuation is extension (and perhaps denotation); and the focus of 
classificatory organization is taxonomy (and perhaps relations like that of genus and species, though 
in an inclusive, metaphysical-not-necessarily-biological sense).  Consider the following illustration: 
 
Fig. 1  Three classificatory activities, each with a visual depiction of the sort of 
choices being offered by that activity.  To put it crassly, characterization is about 
building boxes, individuation is about putting things in boxes, and organization is 
about arranging boxes. 
As the figure shows, characterization, individuation, and organization are all quite distinct 
classificatory activities.  To summarize the proposed distinction in theoretical terms: characterization 
                                               
cream and gelato are more closely related to one another than either is to sorbet.” 
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tends to focus on definition; individuation on instances; and organization on taxonomy.  They each 
inform each other, of course, and comprehensive classification efforts consider all three elements 
together—rather than focusing on just one element, to the exclusion of the others.  But it is worth 
conceptually disentangling these elements of classification, especially when dealing with difficult 
cases. 
To demonstrate the proposed distinction in action, and with a difficult case, let us reconsider 
the species problem.  Many biologists and philosophers of biology have considered the question of 
how to define the term ‘species’, and given divergent answers.8  This is primarily a question about 
the classificatory characterization of species.  There is a reproductive characterization of the species 
concept, according to which species are defined in terms of factors like interbreeding (e.g., Mayr 
1957); an ecological characterization, according to which species are defined in terms of factors like 
niche (e.g., Van Valen 1976); a phylogenetic characterization, according to which species are defined 
in terms of factors like historical connectedness of individuating characteristics (e.g., Cracraft 1983); 
a cohesion characterization, according to which species are defined in terms of factors like 
demographic and genetic integration (e.g., Templeton 1989); and more.  Some theorists have even 
given pluralist answers to the ‘species’ question—answers that defend divergent “conceptions” of 
the species “concept” as not just acceptable but appropriate (e.g., Ereshefsky 1992).9 
Although the question of how to define the term ‘species’ emphasizes characterization, how 
that question is answered also interacts with issues of classificatory individuation.  Utilizing a biological 
conception of species—with its emphasis on interbreeding capabilities—might make each asexual 
                                               
8 For an alternative demonstration of the distinction between classificatory characterization, 
individuation, and organization (involving the term ‘protein’ rather than ‘species’), please see 
Havstad (2016). 
9 Here I am relying on the concept–conception distinction credited to Hart (1961), employed by 
Rawls (1971), and introduced to me by Burge (1993) and Hardimon (2003). 
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organism its own species.  Alternatively, utilizing a cohesion conception of species might group a 
lineage of certain asexual organisms together.  Candidate tokens will be differentially typed according 
to different species concepts; alternative conceptions of the species concept can generate alternative 
instances of species individuation.10  The direction of influence can also go the other way: firm 
commitments to particular instances of species individuation can also affect which among the many 
species conceptions seem plausible. 
Finally, to point to elements of classificatory organization, it is possible to arrange individuated 
species differentially with respect to one another—producing distinct taxonomies of the relations 
among species.  Some argue, for instance, that bird species originate within the group of dinosaurs 
known as maniraptoran theropods (e.g., Smith et al. 2015); others dispute this, arguing that bird 
species are descended from a group of basal archosaurs (e.g., Feduccia 2013).  At least until such 
disagreement is resolved, there are divergent taxonomies depicting the evolutionary relationships 
amongst various bird, dinosaur, and early reptile species. 
 Divergence, disagreement, and controversy run rampantly through all three of the distinct 
dimensions of species classification: in disputes over definitions of the term (characterization), in 
confusion around the individuation of particular organisms and (meta)populations as belonging to 
one or more species (individuation), and in construction of alternative phylogenies (organization).  This 
makes the species problem a very hard problem to solve, and I suspect it also tempts many strict 
natural kind theorists to simply walk away from the species table.  Although it surely would have 
been nice for such theorists if species had turned out to be natural kinds, properly understood, 
perhaps the nature of evolution and the messiness of biology are determined to thwart this desire.  
                                               
10 Note that alternative conceptions of a concept do not have to generate alternative systems of 
individuation. It is possible for competing definitions of a term to have the same extension. So, 
characterization-level pluralism does not necessarily produce individuation-level pluralism. 
  13 
Even spanning (somewhat) different interpretations of what constitutes traditional or strict natural 
kinds, properly understood, the dominant conclusion of those who attend to the metaphysically-
focused literature is that species cannot meet such requirements (e.g., Wilson 1982; Wilkerson 1993; 
Ellis 2001, 2002; Wikforss 2005; though see Dumsday 2012 and Bird 2018).  Those who admit 
species into the ranks of the natural kinds tend to come from the other side of the divide in the 
literature—the practice-emphasizing philosophy of science side—and to have a rather permissive or 
deflationary account of what a natural kind is (e.g., Boyd 1999; Griffiths 1999; Rieppel 2007; 
Brigandt 2009; Magnus 2012; Ereshefsky & Reydon 2015; Khalidi 2018; though see Devitt 2008 and 
Elder 2008).  These are not the sleepers who dream of natural kinds as nested stacking dolls. 
 Since I aim to a present a crosscutting case that is hard for the strict natural kind theorist to 
reject—leading them to abandon the hierarchy thesis instead—I will not be relying on biological 
species to make my argument.  But the reaction of strict natural kind theorists to the species 
problem—with its entangled divergence in all three classificatory activities—does indicate what sort 
of case might (not) be worth pursuing.  Despite the fact that philosophers of all stripes have long 
attended to questions of classificatory characterization—to understanding the meaning of category 
terms, and providing compelling definitions of those terms—the term ‘species’ has stubbornly 
resisted characterization, and this has led to its widespread abandonment as a candidate natural kind, 
properly understood.  Hence, an uncharacterizable natural kind term is not a good candidate for my 
argument: its uncharacterizability threatens its prior plausibility as a natural kind.  Such terms also 
permit unsatisfying deferrals of the issue at hand—conditional responses like “if there were a unified 
account of the species concept as a natural kind, properly understood, then there would be a unified 
way to structure the relationships among species taxa.” 
 Cases involving problematic individuation, though similarly philosophically familiar, are also 
unsuited to my argument, though for different reasons.  While vagueness is interesting, and the 
  14 
existence of tokens which confound classification by type is undisputable, philosophers have 
developed popular tools for dealing with this sort of classificatory divergence.  Probably the 
dominant account of biological kindhood today is that of Boyd’s (1991, 1999) homeostatic property 
cluster (HPC) kinds—and this view has accommodation for this sort of vagueness built right in.  An 
entity that displays some but not all of the properties which usually characterize a member of an 
HPC kind may or may not be classified as a token of that type, and it is up to the natural kind 
theorist to decide whether natural kinds, properly understood, can accommodate such clusters.  
Divergent individuation within a natural kind is obviously and directly salient to questions about 
essence, but our primary subject matter is hierarchy.  Hierarchy is most clearly implicated when it 
comes to classificatory organization, with its focus on taxonomy.  A case of genuinely divergent 
classificatory organization among natural kinds just is a case where there is more than one true 
taxonomy of those purportedly natural kinds. 
We have finally arrived back at Khalidi’s intriguing case of divergent taxonomies of poisons 
among toxicologists (from Khalidi 1998, 49–50), and now we can articulate precisely what about the 
case utilizes crosscutting kindhood to threaten the hierarchic thesis: it is a case of intradisciplinary, 
divergent classificatory organization.  The presentation of divergent classificatory organization 
(despite uncontroversial characterization and individuation) is crucial to successfully challenging the 
expectation of hierarchy.  Plus, the intradisciplinary nature of the exposed classificatory divergence 
makes it difficult to dismiss the divergence as a mere byproduct of the dilution of epistemic interests 
by non-epistemic ones (as typically occurs when comparing taxonomies constructed by botanists, 
florists, gardeners, and chefs—for instance).  The intradisciplinary nature of Khalidi’s case was not 
quite sufficient, however: the general category or subsuming kind (‘poison’) was not quite 
scientifically respectable enough.  What my argument needs is a case of intradisciplinary, divergent 
classificatory organization—but for which the general category or subsuming kind is irrefutably 
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scientific, rather than borrowed in any relevant way from natural language. 
3. Nuclear Receptors 
Allow me to introduce one such irrefutably scientific category: a group of genetic transcription 
factors commonly known as ‘the nuclear hormone receptor superfamily’.  This superfamily is a set 
of proteins which act as transcriptional activation switches—by working inside the nucleus of cells 
and binding directly to DNA, in order to change broad patterns of transcriptional activity.  So, these 
are proteins which influence and control the production of other proteins.  Nuclear receptors are 
both large and complex, and their transcriptional activation powers are triggered by either 
interaction with one another or with other molecules.  Each term in the name—the (i) nuclear (ii) 
hormone (iii) receptor (iv) superfamily—communicates something about the characterization of the 
group.  The group is (i) nuclear because its members act within the nucleus of cells, binding directly 
to DNA; the group consists of (ii) hormone (iii) receptors because its members are receptive to 
certain hormones, and because receiving such hormones causes the receptors to act on 
transcriptional processes; and the group is a (iv) superfamily because it contains significantly 
disparate sub-groups, or families.  As I will show, the same scientists in the same labs within the 
same domain classify the nuclear receptors in a variety of ways, and use these various classification 
systems interactively and even simultaneously. 
Before further detailing the divergent, intradisciplinary classificatory organization of the 
nuclear hormone receptor superfamily, however, I will first establish ‘nuclear receptor’ as a 
legitimate scientific kind—providing a brief history of the elucidation of the superfamily and 
answering any pertinent questions about its classificatory characterization and individuation along 
the way.  Let us start with the smallest, earliest component of our story: the hormones themselves.  
In 1915, an American scientist named Edwin C. Kendall (1886–1972) initially reported using x-ray 
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crystallography to solve the structure of thyroid hormone (Kendall 1915).  However, Kendall’s 
proposed structure turned out to be incorrect, and the correct structure of thyroid hormone was not 
solved for another decade, by the Welsh chemist Sir Charles Robert Harrington (1897–1972).11  
Thyroxine was first synthesized a year later (Harrington & Barger 1927).  Yet thyroid hormone is a 
molecule composed of only a few dozen atoms.  The thyroid hormone receptors have primary 
sequences that are hundreds of amino acids long, and molecular weights of over 50,000 Da—
meaning, these molecules are composed of thousands of atoms.  Compared to the hormones 
themselves, these are huge, unbelievably complicated molecules.  They, and others like them, could 
not even begin to be understood until their encoding sequences were identified, and they could not 
be manufactured until scientists found out how to trick bacteria into making the receptors for them.  
The discovery of restriction enzymes in the 1960s, the advent of recombinant DNA technology in 
the 1970s, the decades-long development of sequencing methods, and the application of polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) starting in the 1980s all contributed to open up the field of nuclear receptor 
research.12  Once cloning had allowed scientists to finally generate sufficient amounts of the 
molecules of interest, other techniques like PCR and sequencing could be applied to crack the 
complexity of their molecular codes. 
One might wonder what makes the hormones and their receptors so intriguing, however.  
Thomas Hunt Morgan had argued as early as 1926 that, since all the cells of an organism contain the 
                                               
11 Various explanations for this mistake have been offered: for example, that Kendall was rushing at 
the end of 1914 in order to be able to present his findings at a meeting in early 1915; that he was 
unskilled at x-ray crystallography because he was a physiologist and not a chemist; and that he failed 
to appropriately isolate the hormone from the gland material in the first place.  Do not fret about 
Kendall, however: he redeemed himself with his work on the hormones of the adrenal gland, for 
which (in 1950) he eventually received a Nobel Prize. 
12 These developments are well chronicled elsewhere, so I will not present them in any detail here. 
For more, please see Wright (1986), Rabinow (1996), Yi (2008), García-Sancho (2010), and Loenen 
et al. (2014)—among others. 
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same genetic material, but different cell types develop and function very differently, there must be 
some kind of system of differential expression of select genes in different cell types (Morgan 1926, 
1934).  Morgan called the question of what this system could be a “paradox,” or “the problem of 
development.”13  The puzzle, for Morgan, was in figuring out how such a system might work—
whether the answer was programmatic, successive action of genes; or a protoplasm-based kind of 
context-responsivity; or something else that had not yet been conceived.  During his 1934 Nobel 
Lecture, Morgan glossed the way his contemporaries thought about developmental genetics as “all 
the genes acting in the same way all the time.”  Rush to work on Morgan’s puzzle did not 
immediately overtake the field.  Still, early efforts to deduce a resolution coalesced in the field of 
variable gene activity, and current efforts tend to reside in the fields of gene expression and 
evolutionary developmental biology.14  It is in the field of gene expression, as work related to solving 
Morgan’s puzzle, that efforts to understand the nuclear mechanism of steroid hormone action 
eventually found a home. 
Earl W. Sutherland, Jr. (a biochemist from Kansas, 1915–1974) is generally credited with 
doing the scientific work that categorically established how hormones work.  Based on his research 
on cyclic 3, 5-AMP, Sutherland proposed a model of hormone signaling in which a hormone binds 
to the outer surface of an embedded trans-membrane receptor molecule, releasing another signaling 
molecule, previously bound to the inner surface of the trans-membrane receptor, into the cytoplasm 
(Sutherland & Robinson 1966).  His theoretical account was named the “second messenger 
hypothesis” because it includes a hormone (the first, extracellular messenger), as well as another 
                                               
13 From Morgan’s Nobel Lecture, “The Relation of Genetics to Physiology and Medicine,” given on 
June 4, 1934. 
14 For foundational work in the field of variable gene activity, see Stedman and Stedman (1950).  For 
a nice review of the development of the field of gene expression, see Raj and van Oudenaarden 
(2008).  For a brief assessment of evo-devo, see Arthur (2002). 
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signaling molecule (the second, intracellular messenger), communicatively linked together via a trans-
membrane receptor (embedded in the boundary of the cell).  This model is still used to characterize 
the signaling action of various hormones, and in 1971 Sutherland was awarded a Nobel Prize “for 
his discoveries concerning the mechanism of the action of hormones.”15  But even as Sutherland 
gave his Nobel lecture, the honoree already had to add a caveat: 
Of course the various relations in the endocrine system cannot all be understood in 
terms of a simple concept… the primary action of the steroid hormones appears to 
follow an entirely different pattern. (Sutherland 1972, 405)16 
This rather understated qualification had to be made because of the unexpected results of Elwood 
V. Jensen’s studies of the estrogen receptor.  Estrogen is one of the steroid hormones. 
It has been reported (by Moore 2012) that Jensen (1920–2012, born in North Dakota) began 
his work on the estrogen receptor as early as 1958—perhaps before Sutherland had even begun to 
think of the second messenger hypothesis.  The molecule Sutherland used (cyclic 3, 5-AMP) was 
only discovered in 1957.  Jensen’s experiments tagging and tracking estrogen with radioactive labels 
showed the hormone accumulating in the nucleus of cells, rather than bound to the surface of cells 
or even in the cytoplasm where most cellular interactions occur (Jensen & Jacobson 1962).  But 
these results confounded the theoretical expectations of the time, and other scientists lacked the 
means required to make sense of them.  Sutherland’s grudging admission of unresolved questions 
surrounding the mechanism of steroid hormone action—more than a decade after Jensen’s initial 
results, and as Sutherland himself was accepting a Nobel prize for purportedly definitive work—is a 
fitting indicator of the field’s stilted but eventual recognition of the import of Jensen’s discovery. 
                                               
15 This description is from the Karolinska Institutet’s October 1971 Press Release announcing their 
decision to award that year’s Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine to Sutherland. 
16 This quote is from a published version of Sutherland’s Nobel Lecture.  It came out the year after 
the speech was given. 
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In sum, the development of key techniques—moving from virology and bacteriology into 
molecular biology much more generally—encouraged a renewal of interest in Morgan’s puzzle, by 
providing both the methods for producing enough material for study and the means for dealing with 
the size and complexity of such material.17  After a long incubation period, the search for something 
that could differentially control gene expression rapidly became hurried and fierce.  This something 
was dubbed a ‘transcription factor’.  Jensen’s work on estrogen—work showing the hormone 
accumulating inside the nucleus, interacting directly with genetic material—made the estrogen 
receptor and other steroid hormone receptors extremely promising candidates as potential 
transcription factors.  Altogether these conditions led to the (delayed) acceptance of Jensen’s work, 
as well as to the capacity to actually figure out what his results indicated, and suddenly steroid 
hormone receptor research was transformed into an incredibly competitive and potentially lucrative 
scientific endeavor.  Whoever could identify the protein-coding genetic sequence of a steroid 
hormone receptor could get credit both for that and for the discovery of a transcription factor. 
This realization is followed by an explosion of scientific results.  The first hormone to be 
cloned was human growth hormone (Martial et al. 1979), and just a handful of years later the genes 
encoding two different steroid hormone receptors—glucocorticoid (Hollenberg et al. 1985) and 
estrogen (Walter et al. 1985)—had been sequenced and cloned as well.  Following studies detected a 
surprising alignment of sequences from the erb-A protooncogene family with those of the already-
sequenced steroid hormone receptors—again, glucocorticoid (Evans et al. 1986) and estrogen 
(Green et al. 1986).  By the end of year, it had been determined that what had been known as the c-
erb-A gene sequence actually encoded the receptor for thyroid hormone (Weinberger et al. 1986). 
                                               
17 This might be an opportune time to remind the reader that, in contrast with the case Khalidi 
(1998) used to demonstrate crosscutting (‘poison’), this case has been chosen for its bona fide 
scientific chops.  It is those chops which are currently being demonstrated, so that the case cannot 
be summarily dismissed as not scientific enough. 
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But thyroid hormone is not a steroid.  All steroids are derivatives of cholesterol, and thyroid 
hormone is a tyrosine-based hormone.  So, alignment of the sequences for all three of these 
receptors—glucocorticoid, estrogen, and thyroid—suggested that physiological use of a signaling 
mechanism in which the receptor invaded the nucleus might not be restricted to steroid hormone 
receptors, those which Jensen had initially detected.  It might include other hormone receptors, such 
as the one for thyroid, as well.  The general term for any signaling molecule capable of activating a 
receptor is ‘ligand’.  So, alignment of the sequences of the glucocorticoid, estrogen, and thyroid 
receptors extended the group of known ligands for these receptors from just steroid hormones to 
also include thyroid hormone.  To complicate matters even further, additional sequences were soon 
aligned; these sequences were shown to encode novel receptors; and the ligands identified for these 
receptors were vitamin D (McDonnell et al. 1987) and retinoic acid (Petkovich et al. 1987), the 
derivative of retinol or vitamin A.  This discovery—that some vitamins and their derivatives might 
function, hormone-like, as signaling molecules—was another startling revelation.  One way of 
describing the evolving situation within this field, during the rapid developments of the late 1980s, is 
as one of surprising confrontation with a spreading pool of potential ligands for an ever-expanding 
group of receptors. 
 Early on in this process there was uncertainty about what to call the group of molecules 
being discovered.  In the presentation abstract of one of the initial talks on the subject of a potential 
“family of eukaryotic transcriptional regulatory factors” (Evans et al. 1986, 63), the terms ‘paradigm’, 
‘class’, ‘mechanism’, and ‘family’ were all used.  The term ‘superfamily’ was first used publicly in the 
title of another talk later that year (Weinberger et al. 1986).  That did not settle the matter, however.  
Early in 1988, another discussion claimed that “the isolation of novel steroid hormone receptor 
cDNAs is a step towards identifying a new hormone response system” (Giguère et al. 1988, 94).  In 
this discussion, the terms ‘class’, ‘group’, and ‘system’ were used.  But only a few months later, what 
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turned out to be the definitive review was published, and the term ‘superfamily’ became firmly 
established (Evans 1988). 
4. Divergent Organization of the Superfamily 
Throughout the subsequent decade after Evans’ review,18 additional cloning and alignment studies as 
well as the development of various screening techniques (such as low stringency hybridization 
screening) soon uncovered novel receptors, some with undetermined ligands (Mangelsdorf et al. 
1995).  Today there are 48 commonly recognized members of the nuclear hormone receptor 
superfamily in humans.  There is one additional found in mice for a total of 49 in that species, and 
one missing in rats for a total of 47 there.  Among less related species the numbers fluctuate quite a 
bit more: there are 21 nuclear receptors found in Drosophila melanogaster, for example, but more than 
270 in Caenorhabditis elegans (Zhang et al. 2004).  Nuclear receptors have been found in all but only 
the animals, and no evolutionary precursors have yet been found. 
Among the 48 nuclear receptors found in humans, a handful are still missing the ligand, or 
receptor activation component, of their ligand-receptor-gene triad.  In a somewhat unsettling 
extension of the family metaphor, these nuclear receptors are called ‘orphan’ receptors.  Most of the 
receptors (orphans and the rest) have several names, since each lab that works with them tends to 
pick a name and attempt to get it established in the literature.  Attempts have been made to 
standardize the nomenclature for individual receptors (Nuclear Receptors Nomenclature Committee 
1999), but such attempts have only partially succeeded.  There have also been many, many proposals 
for how to organize the nuclear receptors with respect to one another—but unlike the different 
                                               
18 According to Web of Science, Evans’ (1988) review in Science has been cited 6,822 times. According 
to the same database, Watson and Crick’s (1953) Nature paper on the structure of DNA has been 
cited 7,090 times. This is just to indicate, via an illustrative comparison, the significance of the 
scientific work on the nuclear hormone receptor superfamily. Data obtained 9:25pm EST, 
September 9, 2019. 
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names for individual receptors, these distinct organization schemes are not gratuitous competitors; 
they are indispensable alternatives.  The field does not seek to establish one exclusive, exhaustive 
system for organizing the nuclear receptors (as it does for naming them). 
Just to be clear, what we have here is strong scientific consensus about what the nuclear 
receptors are (i.e., how to characterize them), as well as how many there are (i.e., how to individuate 
them).  When you bundle species-specific nuclear receptors together, you get a superfamily of the 
nuclear receptors that exist within that species—an encompassing kind composed of tightly related, 
narrower kinds.  The lingering classificatory question is how to structure the relationships among the 
nuclear receptors (what we might call the sub-kinds relative to this question) within the superfamily 
(what we might call the super-kind relative to this question).  And the nuclear receptors cluster with 
respect to one another in multiple, divergent ways.  It is finally time to demonstrate what an 
irrefutably scientific case of intradisciplinary classificatory divergent organization looks like. 
One set of schemes for organizing the nuclear receptors with respect to one another—the 
first set of such schemes to develop—is a group of procedural typologies of the nuclear hormone 
receptor superfamily united by a tendency to sort the nuclear receptors on the basis of mechanistic 
considerations such as kind of ligand,19 which tends to correlate with patterns of activation and 
binding,20 as well as with locational considerations such as where a nuclear receptor usually resides 
prior to activation.21  Initial typologies of the procedural sort simply divided the nuclear receptors 
into two groups: the endocrine receptors (ones for which steroid, thyroid, and other hormone-like 
molecules act as ligands) and the orphan receptors (ones for which ligands had not yet been 
                                               
19 A ‘part’ à la Glennan (2002), as well as Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005); an ‘entity’ à la Craver and 
Darden (2013). 
20 ‘Interactions’ for Glennan (2002); ‘operations’ for Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005); ‘activities’ for 
Craver and Darden (2013). 
21 ‘Organization’ for Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005); ‘set up conditions’ for Craver and Darden 
(2013). 
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identified).  But the early discovery (Mangelsdorf et al. 1990) of a distinction between some of the 
nuclear receptors (those which function with copies of themselves, as homodimers) and others 
(those which require a co-factor for high-affinity binding, making them heterodimers) quickly led to 
more fine-grained procedural typologies.  Consider the following pair of diagrams: 
 
Fig. 2  On the left, an early division of the nuclear hormone receptor superfamily 
divided into four classes—the (homodimeric) steroid receptors, RXR heterodimers, 
dimeric orphan receptors, and monomeric orphan receptors (Mangelsdorf et al. 
1995, 836).  On the right, an updated version of the older style of typing the 
superfamily, simply separating nuclear receptors into three groups—the endocrine 
receptors, adopted orphans, and the (not yet adopted) orphans (Shi 2007, 441). 
Both of these examples are based on procedural considerations, such as what kind of molecule 
activates each receptor, and whether the activation process requires an accessory molecule (a co-
factor) or not.  There have been many such typologies offered; these are just two instances. 
 But there are also many examples of an entirely different way of organizing the nuclear 
receptors with respect to one another.  I have already discussed the importance of gene sequence 
alignment studies in unexpectedly expanding the nuclear hormone receptor superfamily to include 
members of unanticipated kinds (such as not just steroid but also other hormone receptors, and 
then not just hormone but also vitamins and other hormone-like receptors).  With the advent of 
cheaper and easier sequencing techniques—plus ever-increasing computational power for aligning 
the sequenced material—came the development of phylogenetic methods for organizing the nuclear 
hormone receptor superfamily.  These phylogenetic methods often rely on the concept of protein 
‘domain’.  Protein domains are distinct, somewhat independent regions of these macromolecules 
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(for a philosophical discussion of this concept, please see Love [2009]). 
Nuclear receptors have five domains: an initial n-terminal domain (highly variable); a DNA-
binding domain (highly conserved); a hinge region (between the previous domain and the next one); 
a ligand-binding domain (moderately conserved); and a final c-terminal domain (highly variable).  
Innovation in sequencing and computing technology means that amino acid sequence alignments, 
partial gene sequence alignments, domain-based alignments, and whole-sequence alignments can all 
be conducted.  Expansion of the superfamily also makes it possible to vary the set of nuclear 
receptors being aligned, to include just those found in humans, or those found in humans, mice, and 
rats; or those found in humans and fruit flies; etc.  Consider another pair of diagrams: 
 
Fig. 3  On the left, an early phylogeny based on just the DNA binding domain of a 
set of nuclear receptors found in human, mouse, newt, rat, and frog species (Detera-
Wadleigh & Fanning 1994, 198).  On the right, another early phylogeny of the 
nuclear hormone receptor superfamily—one based on comparison of the DNA-
binding domains, hinge regions, and ligand-binding domains of 65 nuclear receptors 
in vertebrates, arthropods, and nematodes (Nuclear Receptors Nomenclature 
Committee 1999, 161; based on work published in Laudet 1997). 
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By varying which nuclear receptors are included as well as which domains are used for comparison, 
it is possible to generate myriad phylogenies of the nuclear hormone receptor superfamily.  
Regardless, certain phylogenetic “families” within the superfamily have become somewhat firmly 
established: the thyroid hormone receptor-like family, the retinoid X receptor-like family, the 
estrogen receptor-like family, the nerve growth factor IB-like family, the steroidogenic factor-like 
family, and the germ cell nuclear factor-like family.  Within each of these families are further 
groupings into subfamilies; within each subfamily there are usually between one and four receptors. 
Note that more recent phylogenies than the two depicted here can also incorporate some of 
the mechanistic (componential) information typically used to generate procedural typologies of the 
superfamily.  For instance, the phylogeny depicted in Gronemeyer, Gustafsson, and Laudet (2004; 
supplementary information S1) indicates that blue-backgrounded receptors have steroidal ligands; 
the peach background indicates retinoids; yellow is for thyroid hormones; green is for fatty acids and 
derivatives; and the rest of the receptors were orphans at the time this particular phylogeny was 
generated.22  This is an example of a classificatory instance using phylogenetic information for its 
organizing principle, while communicating certain typological information as well.  This sort of 
integrative classificatory practice will be further discussed in section six. 
These two methods for generating various nuclear receptor classification systems—the 
procedurally typological and the phylogenetic—are responsible for most of the many distinct 
instances of nuclear hormone receptor superfamily organization (and these systems do classify the 
nuclear receptors in divergent ways).  There is one additional, distinct method for organizing the 
nuclear hormone receptor superfamily, however.  This method is typological, like the earliest 
                                               
22 Apologies for not reproducing this (or any other more recent) phylogeny.  Printing a color figure 
is expensive; utilizing a color or otherwise figure from any of the Nature-affiliated journals is 
prohibitively so. 
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classification systems, rather than phylogenetic—but it is designed to organize the nuclear receptors 
based on what they do rather than how they do it.  There is, as yet, only one exemplar of this sort of 
effect-based rather than procedural typology of the nuclear hormone receptor superfamily: 
 
Fig. 4  The “ring of physiology” (Bookout et al. 2006, 796). 
This way of organizing the superfamily uses differential patterns of expression of genes coding for 
human and mouse nuclear receptors in distinct cell types, in order to group the receptors by various 
physiological associations.  It represents a somewhat recent development in the organization of 
nuclear receptors.  The late development of this method for organizing the superfamily is 
unsurprising given the massive technological effort that is required to track the expression of such 
large genes for 49 complex receptors throughout 39 different cell types.  Such an approach became 
possible only once quantitative PCR was developed and certain advances in robotic, computing, and 
cloud technologies occurred.  But now the requisite methods and tools are available—at least, they 
are available to incredibly well-funded, well-equipped laboratories. 
The point of this third and final style of classification is to group the nuclear receptors by 
cellular expression, and associated cellular processes, in order to relate the nuclear receptors to 
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clusters of physiological effect.  By grouping the nuclear receptors in this effect-based way, 
researchers can derive testable hypotheses about particular physiological (and pathological) pathways 
with which any given receptor might be predominately involved.  The first and so far only attempt 
to organize the nuclear hormone receptor superfamily by this method (Bookout et al. 2006) 
produced two initial, general “paradigms” of (I) reproduction, development, and growth versus (II) 
nutrient uptake, metabolism, and excretion.  These two paradigms were then each divided into three 
further groups called “clusters,” for a total of six clusters within the superfamily and one lone 
receptor, PNR, which is only expressed in one type of cell and thus cannot be part of a suite of cell 
types.  The six clusters are each labeled by the physiologic pathways they presumably affect: (IA) 
steroidogenesis; (IB) reproduction and development; (IC) central nervous system with circadian and 
basal metabolism; (IIA) bile acids and xenobiotic metabolism; (IIB) lipid metabolism; and (IIC) 
energy homeostasis. 
5. Complexity 
So, what do we have here?  We have some complicated scientific practice based on some complex 
scientific objects.  We can expect, I think, some of the divergent classificatory organization 
presented in the prior section to dissolve as further work occurs.  For example: it is possible that 
there is one best way of organizing species-specific nuclear receptors by activation typology, rather 
than many—and that the scientific community might eventually settle on what that typology is.  We 
could also eliminate some of the divergent classificatory organization showcased above by being 
more consistent about how we generate phylogenies of the superfamily.  Species-specific 
phylogenies (focusing only on the nuclear receptors found in humans, for instance) will naturally 
diverge from more inclusive ones (which can include all those nuclear receptors found in human, 
mice, rat, drosophila and more), and such classificatory divergence is simply a product of different 
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things being classified differently, rather than the same things being classified differently. 
 But a substantive portion of the divergent classificatory organization found here is 
ineliminable.  This is because nuclear receptors are complex objects.  We tend to think of objects of 
a kind as sharing a cluster of their properties and capacities (the essential and / or intrinsic ones, if 
we are metaphysically so-inclined) with others of their kind.  But complex objects like nuclear 
receptors share multiple, distinct clusters of their properties and capacities with several divergent 
kinds, and they belong to each.  When such complex objects are being classified, even scientifically, 
divergent classificatory organization results.  Researchers have incentive to generate any and all those 
classification systems which grant them reliable, fruitful inferences.  Patterns of inference bearing on 
certain themes (which might be called ‘affordances’23) do tend to be differentially valuable from 
different perspectives—even within a narrow, interdisciplinary context.  But this interest-relativity is 
not what generates or explains the naturally divergent kinds; rather, it motivates and rewards our 
recognition of them.  To be pithy, human interests explain the kinding (à la Kendig 2016a, 2016b), 
but not the kinds.24  Consider the following illustration: 
                                               
23 À la Gibson (1977). 
24 Hence, a compatibilist account of complex scientific kind-generation is required—one that 
combines naturalism with conventionalism.  Thanks to Dresow and Love (2018) for suggesting the 
‘compatibilist’ terminology. 
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Fig. 5  How nuclear receptors (as complex objects) beget a trio of divergent 
classification systems for organizing the nuclear hormone receptor superfamily—
affording inferences to things differently valued from different perspectives. 
Drawings by Adam Streed. 
Note that this is not a case of a group of object-kinds clustering closer together or farther apart 
(based on how many properties and capacities they share) on one map showing multiple cluster-
centers.  This is a case in which the same group of object-kinds clusters differently (to different 
degrees and with different neighbors) on three divergent styles of map—each with multiple, unique 
cluster-centers.  The complexity is there, in the kinds, to be divergently mapped. 
 What is complexity, such that it can produce this sort of classificatory divergence?  In a 
helpful analysis of complex systems, Sandra D. Mitchell (2009) identifies four characteristic features: 
(a) multilevel organization; (b) multicomponent causal interaction; (c) contextual plasticity; and (d) 
evolved contingency.  Although Mitchell’s account is designed for complex systems, I think that it 
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can be applied to complex objects as well.25  Nuclear receptors certainly exhibit all four of these 
features; these features are what generate the divergent classificatory organization of the superfamily; 
and the fourth feature in particular (evolved contingency) is what prevents the unification of these 
divergent taxonomies from even being a sensible aim.  In Mitchell’s (2003, 2009) terms, 
integration—as opposed to unification (à la Kitcher 1981)—is the best we can hope for here. 
Let me quickly substantiate my claim that nuclear receptors are complex objects according to 
Mitchell’s four features.  First is (a) multilevel organization, which occurs when there are different 
levels of organization within one complex object.  Nuclear receptors, as proteins, are polypeptides: 
macromolecules composed of multiple amino acids linked by peptide and other bonds.  Proteins are 
not just chains of amino acids, however.  Comprehensive protein structure is divided into four 
different levels: primary structure—amino acid sequence, producing chains; secondary structure—
local bond formation between amino acids, producing shapes like turns and sheets; tertiary 
structure—additional interactions between elements scattered throughout the molecule, completing 
overall conformation; and quaternary structure—multiple-molecule shape formation, producing 
complexes.  Nuclear receptors exhibit the first three of these four levels: they have primary through 
tertiary multilevel organization. 
Next is (b) multicomponent causal interaction.  Again, nuclear receptors in particular and 
proteins in general are large molecules composed of amino acids.  These amino acids are covalently 
linked into a chain via peptide bonds, but also contorted due to a host of other chemical interactions 
that occur among the amino, carboxyl, and variable R-groups, the shapes that clusters of these 
groups form, and even the various shapes formed by separate sequences.  So, these proteins have 
                                               
25 It is common to associate complexity with systems and simplicity with objects.  But this is a 
problematic tendency, as these associations can come apart.  There are simple systems and complex 
objects, so it is a mistake to think of systems as constitutively complex and objects as constitutively 
simple. 
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primary components26 (amino acids) which causally interact to form secondary components (turns 
and sheets) which causally interact to form tertiary components (completing their overall 
conformational structure and determining their interactions with other molecules). 
Then comes (c) contextual plasticity, which for the nuclear receptors (and many other 
proteins) is realized via their different dynamics in different contexts.  Nuclear receptors are 
complex objects which can change their shape.  They can bend and turn, fold and twist, pick things 
up and drop them, even attract and repel certain things.  Nuclear receptors are dynamic and 
contextually plastic, as are most proteins. 
 Finally there is (d) evolved contingency.  One of the strongest constraints on evolution is 
that it must make do with the tools at hand.  And so proteins in general and nuclear receptors in 
particular have often evolved to do different things in different places.  Nuclear receptors have a 
complex structure that allows them to accomplish many different functions.  But another aspect of 
the contingency of evolution is that different structures can evolve to accomplish similar functions.  
Different proteins can do similar things in different ways.  For instance, DNA binding has evolved 
to occur by several methods.  There are triple-zinc-finger motifs and helix-turn-helix motifs, both of 
which allow proteins with these motifs to form a complex with DNA.  In a classification of proteins 
by function, proteins exhibiting either of these motifs might be grouped together.  But in a 
classification of proteins by either structure or ancestry, they would not be grouped together, as 
these two motifs have very distinct structures as well as different evolutionary histories.  This brings 
us back to the main topic under discussion: naturally divergent classificatory organization of nuclear 
receptors, due to their status as complex objects. 
                                               
26 Perhaps better described as parts rather than components, since we are talking about objects 
rather than systems. 
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6. Application of the Case 
To briefly refresh: nuclear receptors are complex multiple-domain proteins that act both as receptors 
and as transcription factors.  Nuclear receptors tend to be expressed in many different cell types and 
often do different things in each.  Some nuclear receptors do similar things in different ways.  
Different parts (such as the ligand-binding and DNA-binding domains) of individual receptors have 
distinct evolutionary histories.  As a result of this multi-level, multi-component, multi-function, and 
multi-evolutionary history, there are three different kinds of system—procedurally typological, 
phylogenetic, and effect-based typological—for classifying the nuclear receptors in the superfamily.  
These distinct kinds of systems for organizing the nuclear hormone receptor superfamily each place 
the nuclear receptors in different groups with different neighbors, and each tend to grant fruitful, 
reliable inferences to certain affordances, differentially valuable from different perspectives.27  There 
is no one true hierarchy to be found, now or ever, among these nonetheless natural kinds. 
 I have deployed an extremely technical and detailed example in order to clearly establish the 
scientific legitimacy of my case, and to dispel any concerns that divergent classificatory organization 
inevitably stems from either non-epistemic human interests or befuddled attempts to scientifically 
                                               
27 For anyone not yet sick of the science: tracking (first) the structural properties and activation-plus-
binding capabilities of nuclear receptors generates procedurally typological classifications of the 
superfamily which tend to afford successful inferences to targetability, which is especially important 
from a biomechanical perspective. Tracking (second) the sequential properties and alignment 
capabilities of nuclear receptors generates alternative phylogenetic classifications of the superfamily 
which tend to afford successful inferences to ancestry, which is especially important from an 
evolutionary perspective. Tracking (third, and finally) the gene expression properties and 
physiological capabilities of nuclear receptors generates effect-based typological classifications of the 
superfamily which tend to afford successful inferences to applicability, which is especially important 
from a biomedical perspective. All three of these perspectives are valuable within the community of 
researchers who study the nuclear receptors: reliable patterns of inference to targetability allow for 
ligands to be discovered or designed, materials to be synthesized, and experiments to be run; reliable 
patterns of inference to ancestry allow for homology inferences to be made, and for information 
known about one nuclear receptor to be potentially applied to other, evolutionarily related receptors; 
and reliable patterns of inference to applicability help to direct, apply, and market early-stage or 
“basic” biomedical research towards more “applied” translational and clinical research. 
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classify non-scientific kinds (as one might think happens with the category ‘poison’).  The story of 
the surprising detection of the nuclear receptors, with gradual elucidation of the nuclear hormone 
receptor superfamily, is a paradigmatic narrative of scientific progress—one incorporating many 
unanticipated moments of puzzlement, conjecture, validation, explanation and prediction along the 
way.  These kinds are scientific in origin and so is their classificatory divergence. 
 But is nuclear receptor complexity, the generator of their classificatory divergence, actually a 
crucial liability here?  One might be tempted to venture—even granting their status as scientific 
kinds—that nuclear receptors and the nuclear hormone receptor superfamily are altogether just too 
complex to be considered as natural kinds, properly understood.  Perhaps the claim would go as 
follows: “if the objects that you are considering are this complex, if they have clusters of features 
that differentially associate with one another in these different ways, then there is just not enough 
linking of properties here—there is too much disassociation—for these groups to achieve natural 
kind status.”  Now consider what this move implies for arrangement of the elements—the example 
par excellence of natural kinds, properly understood. 
Elements have this sort of complexity, although it is often ignored in philosophical 
discourse, which tends to focus on the straightforward characterization of elements by atomic 
number, along with the sharp individuation of atoms into determinate element kinds.  Attending to 
organization instead, we should note that element kinds can (of course) be sorted serially, by lining 
them up in one long sequence (by atomic number).  But that is not (only) what the Periodic Table 
does, because there are other relevant taxonomies of the elements to represent and deploy.  
Vertically (in columns), elements are clustered by group—such as alkali metals, or noble gases—
membership in which is determined by valence (or how many electrons are available for bonding, in 
what kind of outermost shell).  Horizontally (in rows), elements are clustered by block—such as f-
block or p-block—membership in which is determined by atomic orbital type (or how electrons are 
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configured, in what kind of outermost shell).  In each of these taxonomies, a different selection of 
properties and capacities of each element are picked out, putting them in a new group with different 
neighbors.  Serially, the nearest neighbors to argon (atomic number 18) are chlorine (atomic number 
17) and potassium (atomic number 19), but argon is a noble gas while chlorine is a halogen and 
potassium is an alkali metal.   Argon and chlorine are p-block members (with a lobed and principal 
outermost shell), while potassium is an s-block member (its outermost shell is spherical and sharp).  
Obviously, these overlapping, non-nested groups cannot be unified into a single cohesive hierarchy.  
The brilliance of “the” Periodic Table lies precisely its ability to integrate and communicate these 
divergent, crosscutting taxonomies of the elements regardless.28 
 I did not want to rely on the chemical elements to make my overall case, because there are 
many confounding and non-scientific intuitions about them.  I refer to them here only to point out 
that they too are complex objects, and correspondingly they permit of divergent classificatory 
organization.  Any theorist who wants to treat such complexity as prohibitive of natural kind status 
will have to be willing to strike chemical kinds like ‘the noble gases’ and ‘the s-block elements’ from 
their list of candidate natural kinds.  Not even Ellis, the paradigmatic scientific essentialist, is willing 
to bite this bullet.29  Given the scientific status—and proven success—of such kinds, I recommend 
striking the hierarchic thesis instead.  
 Still, perhaps there are some natural kind theorists (unlike Ellis) willing to abandon the s-
block elements and the noble gases, along with the type I nuclear receptors and the PPAR nuclear 
hormone receptor family, as candidate natural kinds—merely on the basis of demonstrated 
                                               
28 Really, there are many—precisely because of the different affordances they differentially allow. 
29 He wants his account to allow for ‘cupric compounds’ and ‘sulfates’ to count as natural kinds, 
despite that they share copper sulfate as a common member while neither kind is a species of the 
other (2001, 56n2).  And such kinds are less foundational to chemistry than the columns, rows, and 
blocks of the Periodic Table, surely. 
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classificatory divergence.  Presumably, only the elements themselves and the serially ordered list of 
elements (an arrangement lacking much of what the actual, Mendeleevian Periodic Table has to 
offer), and relatedly, the nuclear receptors themselves and the superfamily itself, would qualify as 
natural kinds from this point of view.  Unfortunately, not even those lower- and higher-level 
groupings would remain; they are not themselves exempt from the sort of classificatory divergence I 
demonstrated at mid-level.  I merely held those levels fixed for the purposes of this discussion, so 
that the existence of mid-level divergent classificatory organization could be made crystal clear. 
I can shatter that clarity.  Take a species-specific nuclear receptor like human PPARg, for 
example.  To which kind does it more naturally belong: that of other human PPARs (like human 
PPARa and human PPARb), or that of non-human, other-species-specific PPARgs (like mouse 
PPARg and rat PPARg)?  Or, take the human nuclear hormone receptor superfamily: where should 
it be placed?  Is the proper genus for this species all the rest of the nuclear receptors found in other 
organisms, or is it all the rest of the transcription factors found in humans?  We can do this with the 
elements and the Periodic Table, too.  There are fifteen known isotopes of carbon (from 8C to 22C).30  
Two of them are naturally-occurring stable isotopes (12C and 13C).  There is one naturally-occurring 
radioisotope (14C).  Which kind is most “natural”: 14C with just the other two naturally-occurring 
isotopes of carbon, 12C and 13C?  Or is it 14C with the other carbon radioisotopes, none of which are 
naturally occurring?  Or perhaps the “natural” kind is just all the carbon isotopes, regardless of 
whether they occur naturally, and are radioactive?  Maybe 14C is most “naturally” grouped with other 
naturally-occurring radioisotopes, none of which are other carbons?  Speaking of this, which is a 
more “natural” way of arranging all the isotopes of every element: sorting them serially by number 
of protons, and then within those groups, by number of neutrons (in both cases, from lowest to 
                                               
30 Or see Hacking’s discussion of phosphorous (2007b, 223–224). 
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highest)?  Or sorting them serially by (temporal) half-life—say, from most to least stable?  Not even 
isotopes of an element have to be neighbors in what are nonetheless perfectly natural scientific 
groupings.31 
So this austere approach does not, after all, preserve the natural kindhood of (for instance) 
the elements themselves and the nuclear hormone receptor superfamily, by sacrificing the natural 
kindhood of (for instance) the noble gases and the mechanistic type II nuclear receptors.  Very little 
at all can be saved by this approach.  What little can be saved will be specified in the conclusion; but 
first, quick discussion of a potential worry. 
7. A Note About Success 
It is currently somewhat fashionable to appeal to success in science, or achievement of epistemic 
aims, for certification of which natural kinds are the genuine ones (e.g., Magnus 2012; Franklin-Hall 
2015).  Someone with this style of view might be concerned about the existence of classificatory 
divergence—if one also thought that such divergence was likely to inhibit scientific success, or 
epistemic achievement.  (It is common to presume that having different classification schemas for 
the same set of objects will hinder investigation.32)  But at least when complex objects are involved, 
classificatory divergence can actually aid in scientific investigation.  As the case of the nuclear 
hormone receptor superfamily shows, divergent classificatory organization can even be used as a 
tool for discovery (à la LaPorte 2004; see also Havstad 2014 for discussion of precisely this case). 
Again, nuclear receptors are incredibly complex objects.  There are many of them.  Each has 
myriad properties and capabilities.  Most do different things in different cell types.  Their structural 
                                               
31 Please see LaPorte (2004), Hendry (2006), and Havstad (2018)—among others—for additional, 
philosophical discussion of isotope classification.  See Kragh (2000) for an historical discussion of 
how close we came to treating isotopes as the fundamental elements of the periodic table. 
32 E.g., “[u]sers of different schemes of representation may find it difficult to coordinate their 
languages” (Kitcher 2001, 47). 
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and functional similarities often diverge.  They have fractured evolutionary histories.  Unsurprisingly, 
this complexity creates special challenges for nuclear receptor research.  Orphans lack known 
ligands—making them almost impossible to intentionally activate and study using typical methods.  
Nuclear receptor gene expression generally occurs in a variety of cell types—so gene expression 
screening tends to produce information overload.  Nuclear receptor activity tends to be widespread, 
diffuse, and diverse in terms of effects—so knockout experiments are often lethal, or they tend to 
produce conflicting results.  Finally, nuclear receptors are active in so many distinct physiological 
pathways, and their malfunction contributes to so many distinct pathologies, that in many cases it 
would be massively wasteful—in others it would be impossible—to attempt to elucidate the 
influence of any particular nuclear receptor on physiology by simply going down the list of things 
that other nuclear receptors have been determined to affect, in each case applying the particular 
techniques and specific tests from that sphere to the nuclear receptor of interest. 
 But with a variety of systems for relating the nuclear receptors to one another—for hunting 
out potential connections that are suggested by a combination of procedural, phylogenetic, and / or 
effect-based groupings—some progress can occasionally be made.  Myriad possibilities for 
investigation can be winnowed down, suggesting a few promising candidates among a nearly 
unlimited number of potential research projects: those that are suggested by multiple associations in 
distinct classification systems—ideally, those that are suggested mechanistically, evolutionarily, and 
physiologically.  The complexity of the nuclear receptors both generates the divergent classification 
systems for organizing the superfamily, and necessitates the integration of these classification 
approaches.  Scientists are facing a plethora of possible paths to pursue, all the while serving 
multiple masters; but considering the different relationships suggested by various classifications of 
the superfamily can help to highlight which are the most promising avenues for future research.  In 
such complex cases, unique hierarchical organization is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
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successful scientific investigation. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
Talk of natural kinds abounds, especially in the philosophy of science.33  Many in this grand 
philosophical tradition have thought that such kinds, properly understood, must permit of only one 
arrangement—that there is a uniquely true, hierarchical ordering of the (strict) natural kinds.  This 
way of thinking about natural kinds—in terms of one true taxonomy—is itself a natural extension of 
thinking about the distinction between natural and artificial kinds as the following have: 
And the Maxim by which all Systems professing to be natural must be tested is this:—that the 
arrangement obtained from one set of characters coincides with the arrangement obtained from 
another set. (Whewell 1840, Book I, 521; italics original) 
 
The rational core of the distinction between natural and artificial classifications is suggested by 
the consideration that in so-called natural classifications the determining characteristics are 
associated, universally or in a high percentage of all cases, with other characteristics, of which 
they are logically independent. (Hempel 1952, 53) 
 
If the new essentialists are right, then things must act in ways that depend on their intrinsic 
properties or structures, and on how these things stand in relation to other things.  
Consequently, it is a necessary truth that things of the same natural kind must always behave 
in exactly the same way (or range of ways with the same probabilities), if they are in 
circumstances of the same kind. (Ellis 2002, 135)34 
                                               
33 This is an area in which so much excellent scholarship has been done that it is almost impossible 
to do justice to the task of appropriately citing the literature.  I am particularly indebted to the 
following works: Nagel 1929; Quine 1969; Thomason 1969; Putnam 1970, 1973, 1975; Kripke 
1972/1980; Mellor 1977; Kitts and Kitts 1979; Dupré 1981, 1983, 1993, 2001, 2002; Mark Wilson 
1982; Kitcher 1984, 1993, 2001; de Sousa 1984; Devitt & Sterelny 1987; Ruse 1987; Wilkerson 1988, 
1993; Meyer 1989; Hacking 1990, 2007a, 2007b; Boyd 1991, 1999; Khalidi 1993, 1998, 2013, 2018; 
Elder 1994, 2008; Griffiths 1996, 1999; Robert A. Wilson 1996, 1999; Millikan 1999; Stanford and 
Kitcher 2000; Ellis 2001, 2002, 2005; LaPorte 2004; Mumford 2005; Slater 2005, 2015; Wikforss 
2005; Hendry 2006, 2012; Reydon 2006; Barrett 2007; Chakravartty 2007; Lowe 2007; Rieppel 2007, 
2010; Soames 2007; Wilson, Barker, and Brigandt 2007; Devitt 2008; Brigandt 2009; Beebee and 
Sabbarton-Leary 2010; Dumsday 2010, 2012; Ruphy 2010; Campbell, O'Rourke, and Slater 2011; 
Bird 2012, 2018; Leonelli 2012; Magnus 2012, 2014, 2018; Needham 2012; Danks 2015; Ereshefsky 
and Reydon 2015; Franklin-Hall 2015; Tahko 2012, 2015; Kendig 2016a, 2016b; Ludwig 2017; 
Bursten 2018; Häggqvist and Wikforss 2018; Longy 2018; McFarland 2018.  I sincerely apologize to 
anyone whom I should have cited but did not. 
34 Again, Ellis wants his account to allow for ‘cupric compounds’ and ‘sulfates’ to count as natural 
kinds, even though they share copper sulfate as a common member while neither kind is a species of 
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Any member of a category of objects that shares causal properties with other members, either 
strictly in the case of essence kinds, or more loosely in the case of cluster kinds, can be 
expected to be similar and to behave in similar ways in similar circumstances. (Chakravartty 
2007, 170)35 
 
Two types of materials that are similar deep down will have many properties in common. 
(Longy 2018, 1482) 
 
Collectively, this way of thinking—one which relates the naturalness of one grouping to the artifice 
of another—mistakes similarity for sameness.  Two types of materials that are the same, deep down, 
will certainly have many properties in common.  Two types of materials that are similar, deep down, 
will have some properties in common.  If the two types of similar materials are very similar, then they 
may indeed have many properties in common.  Or, if the two types of materials are very simple, then 
they may have most of their properties in common (as they might not have that many properties to 
begin with).  But if the two types of material are complex, then the fact that they are similar will not 
necessarily tell you that they have many properties in common.  Nor will their sort of similarity 
necessarily be trivial, and kind-talk pertaining to them be artificial. 
 The ultimate aim of this paper was to demonstrate that, due to the existence of complexity 
in nature, even the natural kinds permit of more than one hierarchical arrangement—that there is 
more than one taxonomy of natural kinds, properly understood.  I deployed the case of the nuclear 
hormone receptor superfamily—an undeniably complex and irrefutably scientific grouping—to 
achieve my aim.  I showed that—despite clarity and consensus about how to characterize the nuclear 
                                               
the other (2001, 56n2).  I do not know how to reconcile this aim with the quote above.  Copper 
sulfate and copper oxide are both cupric compounds, but they certainly do not behave the same way 
(or range of ways) in circumstances of the same kind.  For instance: copper oxide is not a sulfate. 
35 Chakravartty also writes: “In the case of essence kinds, definitional generalizations describing 
members in terms of their essential properties will be exceptionless, but the same cannot be said of 
behavioral generalizations.  Essences are no guarantee of uniform behavior among the members of a 
kind, even in exactly similar circumstances” (2007, 173). So, this author is only sometimes guilty of 
this misunderstanding. 
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receptors, and how to individuate them—the status of the nuclear receptors as complex objects 
produces ineliminable classificatory divergent organization, even in an intradisciplinary context.  And 
I could play this game in other arenas: with other transcription factors, proteins, molecules, atoms, 
or particles.  Appealing to the sort of complexity that nuclear receptors have as a blanket prohibitor 
of natural kind status means entities like the elements are not natural kinds either. 
Only if nature were limited to the very simplest assortment of objects and properties would 
science correspondingly be restricted to just one hierarchical arrangement of its natural kinds.  
Imagine that there was only one kind of property in existence, P1, and that all objects had only this 
property in discrete but variable amounts—all objects could be represented as 1P1, 2P1, 3P1, … nP1.  
This is a state of nature which plausibly permits of just one hierarchical arrangement of its natural 
kinds (a serial one).  However, if any contrastive interactions between instances of the property P1 
occur—say, if instances of the property function in paired sets differently than they do in unpaired 
sets—then multiple taxonomic arrangements already begin to suggest themselves.  Objects with an 
even number of property instances (2P1, 4P1, etc.) on the one hand, and objects with an odd number 
of property instances (1P1, 3P1, etc.) on the other, might in each case be more “natural” neighbors 
with one another than with their serial-number neighbors.  Another way to think about this is via 
the introduction of a second property type, P2.  As soon as we have an assortment of objects like 
1P1, 2P1, 1P2, and 2P2, we can ask: which arrangement of kinds is more “natural”?  That which 
groups 1P1 with 1P2, while grouping 2P1 with 2P2?  Or that which groups 1P1 with 2P1, while 
grouping 1P2 with 2P2?  Naturally crosscutting categories occur at extremely low levels of 
complexity; all you really need is variation along two disassociating dimensions. 
In other words: it takes very, very little in the way of complexity to kill hierarchy.  Such 
complexity is evident in nature.  I suppose one could insist that the only “natural” kinds are those 
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which do not permit of such hierarchical flexibility.  But this view mistakes sameness as the standard 
for similarity, and treats an epistemic ideal—simplicity—as the criterion for what is categorically real. 
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